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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This is an appeal from a final Judgment by Default and
from an Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment by the
Honorable Robert C. Gibson of the Fifth Circuit Court, County of
Salt Lake, State of Utah, Salt Lake Department.

Jurisdiction is

based on Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and
Utah Pules of Civil Procedure § 78-4-11.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT TO PLAINTIFF AND IN
REFUSING TO SET ASIDE SUCH DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT, WHERE DEFENDANT HAD ANSWERED
AND DILIGENTLY PURSUED THE MATTER BUT ARRIVED
LATE FOR THE TRIAL, AND PLAINTIFF PRESENTED NO
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ANY ALLEGATIONS IN THE
UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT.
ii

RULES
U.R.C.P. Rule 55(b),
(b) Judgment
Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(2) By the Court,
In all other cases the party entitled to a judqment
by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to
enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it
is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of
damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or
to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may
conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems
necessary and proper.
(c) Setting Aside Default.
For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry
of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may
likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b).
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed
to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judqment should
have prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifyinq
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or
(4), not more than three months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This Rule does not limit the power of a court to
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judqment for fraud
upon the court. The procedure for obtaininq any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these Rules or by an
independent action.
iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action began in October of 1984f and involves a
dispute over services rendered by Defendantf Mr. Harrison.

Mr.

Harrison answered Plaintiff's unverified complaint, stated the
existence of several

meritorious

thereafter engaged in discovery.

defenses

and

the

parties

The documents on file show that

Mr. Harrison has diligently sought to pursue his defenses in this
matter.

Notice of the trial in this matter on January 5, 1987,

did not reach Mr. Harrison until the day of trial and then by
telephone call from his teenaged daughter.*

At that time Mr.

Harrison was out of town and immediately returned to appear for
the trial,

but arrived late.

The court clerk told Mr. Harrison,

as shown by minute entry (see Addendum Exhibit " A " ) , no default
had

been entered

and

that

the matter had

been continued.

Defendant also learned that Plaintiff had appeared, but he had
not been prepared with evidence, presented no evidence, and his
Motion for Judgment was denied.
On January 26, 1987, a private meeting was held between
Plaintiff's counsel and Judge Gibson.

Mr. Harrison was unaware

1
Mr. Harrison normally receives his mail at a business box
number. The notice of trial setting was sent to his home
address. Mr. Harrison rarely checks the mail at his home
address. His daughter routinely receives the mail at the
home address. She failed to recognize the importance of the
Notice of Trial Setting and failed to inform Mr. Harrison
until the day set for trial.
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that this meeting was being held, and notice thereof was never
sent to him.

At that meeting, Plaintiff's counsel presented and

discussed a Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion for
Default Judgment.

Mr. Harrison was not provided with a copy and

was unaware of the memorandum prior to this meeting.

Judge

Gibson granted the motion and entered Default Judgment on that
date.

Addendum Exhibit "B". Thereafter, Mr. Harrison learned of

the judgment for the first time when he received a copy of the
Notice of Judgment from Plaintiff's counsel.
Mr. Harrison immediately took action to set aside the
Default Judgment by filing a motion and affidavit in support
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1).

Mr. Harrison

acted with due diligence in pursuing the matter upon his discovery of this mistake.

A hearing was held on Mr. Harrison's

Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment on March 18, 1987. The
court found that Mr. Harrison had failed to use due diligence
prior to the trial, and that there was no excusable neqlect
excusing him for failing to appear for the trial. Motion to set
Aside was Denied.

Addendum Exhibit n C M .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) provides that on motion, the court
may, in the furtherance of justice, relieve a party from a final
judgment for excusable neglect.

Utah case law has interpreted

this rule liberally to effect the overall goal of affording
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litigants their day in court, when it is clear that the claims
are in dispute and the Defendant is

diligent in pursuing his

rights. The interests of justice and fair play place judgments by
default in disfavor in our law, particularly under facts and
circumstances such as those presented in this case where Plaintiff presented no evidence in support of the claims in his
unverified complaint.

For these reasons, the circuit court erred

in granting a default judgment and in subsequently refusing to
set it aside for good cause shown, as provided in U.R.C.P. Rule
55(c).
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
UNDER U.R.C.P. 60 (b)(1)
"The uniformally acknowledged policy of the law is to
accord litigants the opportunity for a hearing on the merits,
where that can be done without serious injustice to the other
party."

Interstate Excavating v. Agla Development, 611 P.2d 369

(Utah 1980).

For that reason the courts are indulqent towards

the setting aside of default judgments where reasonable justification or excuse for the Defendant's failure to appear exists and
where timely application to set it aside is made. Where there is
doubt about whether a default should be set aside, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of doing so.

In this way the matter

may be resolved in accordance with equity, law and justice.

-3-

Interstate Excavatingy Id,

These principles are particularly

applicable to the present case where Plaintiff presented no
evidence in support of its case.

Thereforef there is no oppor-

tunity for serious injustice to be done to Plaintiff by requiring
him to present his side of the controversy, at a properly noticed
hearing.
The Utah Supreme Court in Interstate Excavating, Id.,
was dealing with facts similar to ours.

Therein, Defendant had

answered and asserted various defenses to Plaintiff's claim.
Following the withdrawal of Defendant's counsel, a notice of the
trial setting was mailed to Defendant, who did not receive it.
More favorably for Plaintiff than in our case, however, the
Plaintiff therein did present evidence in support of its case
before being awarded a default judgment.

Nevertheless, the

Supreme Court was impressed that immediately upon learning of the
judgment, Defendant proceeded diligently with efforts to set it
aside and contest the issues on the merits.

The Supreme Court

reversed the trial court's refusal to set

aside the default

judgment under U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b), further finding that the
interests of justice would be best served thereby.

The Supreme

Court cited Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376
P.2d

951 (1962) which also involved the setting aside of a

default judgment.

Mayhew noted that:

"the court ... should be generally indulqent toward permitting full inquiry and
knowledge of disputes so they can be
-4-

settled advisedly and in conformity with
law and justice.
To clamp a judgment
rigidly and irrevocably on a party without
a hearing is obviously a harsh and oppressive thing.
It is fundamental in our
system of justice that each party to a
controversy should be afforded an opportunity to present his side of the case. For
that reason it is quite uniformly regarded
as an abuse of discretion to refuse to
vacate a default judgment where there is
reasonable justification or excuse for the
defendant's failure to appear, and timely
application is made to set it aside." Id.
at 952.
The party's conduct is also an important fact for the
court to review when resolving doubts in favor of the party
moving to set aside a default judgment.

For example, in Helgesen

v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981) the Supreme Court found
that the lower court had abused its discretion in refusing to set
aside a default judgment.

The Plaintiff's attorney and Defen-

dant's insurance adjuster had been in frequent contact with each
other for months regarding the claims, and Plaintiff knew that
Defendant intended to defend the actions, but proceeded to have a
default judgment entered without so little as a phone call to the
Defendant's adjuster.

The court was appalled that Plaintiff did

this with full knowledge of the Defendant's position and did not
have the courtesy to contact and make an inquiry.

The court

concluded that Defendant was not guilty of lack of diligence and
that his actions constituted a mistake and excusable neglect
under U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b).
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The court found this to be a case

where the strict procedural rules "must yield to a more basic
rule of fundamental fairness."

Id. at 1082.

A question over the mailing of notices was at issue in
May v. Thompson, 677 P. 2d 1109 (Utah 1984), wherein the Supreme
Court again found the trial court's decision to be arbitrary and
vacated a default judgment.

The rule of balancing equities, the

hardship to the Defendant, and the need to serve the ends of
justice were cited as reasons for the court's decision.

THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY
REQUIRE THAT THE JUDGMENT BE SET ASIDE
Judgments by default are not favored by the courts, nor
are they in the interests of justice and fair play.
Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P. 2d 189 (Utah 1962).
have been particularly

harmed

here, where

Heathman v.

Those interests
no evidence was

presented in support of Plaintiff's claim, vigorously contested
by Mr. Harrison.

Fair play apparently was forgotten when the

lower court, initially hesitating to grant judqment based on no
supporting evidence, then granted judgment pursuant to arguments
presented by Plaintiff's counsel in a private meetinq with the
judge.

Mr. Harrison was given no notice of this meeting and was

provided no advance copy of such memorandum.

There was no

opportunity for his arguments to be heard in opposition to
Plaintiff's memorandum.

The unfairness of this is emphasized by
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the inapplicability of the one out of state case relied upon by
Plaintiff's counsel in support of his contention that a default
could be entered without proving Plaintiff's case.
Firstr Plaintiff admitted in his memorandum that there
are no Utah cases in support of his motion and that various
courts had held to the contrary.

Second, the one Montana case

relied upon by Plaintiff, Archer v. La March Creek Ranch, 571
P.2d 379 (MT 1977) is easily distinguishable.

In Archer, the

defaulted corporate Defendant did not attempt to attend the trial
and apparently there was no reasonable explanation given for such
failure to appear. Excusable neglect was not at issue. However,
at trial both oral and documentary evidence was introduced by
another party in support of the same affirmative defenses raised
by the corporation.

Reviewing each of those defenses, the court

found that the burden of proof had not been carried.
The Utah rule was well stated in Heathman, supra at 190,
where Plaintiff complained of the court's setting aside of his
default against Defendant based on Defendant's excusable neglect
under U.R.C.P. Rules 55(c) and 60(b).

The court indicated once

again the strong jurisprudential disfavor towards judgments by
default:
"No one has an inalienable or constitutional right to a judgment by default
without a hearing on the merits.
The
courts, in the interest of justice and fair
play, favor, where possible, a full and
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complete opportunity for a hearing on the
merits of every case."

GOOD CAUSE EXISTS UNDER U.R.C.P. RULE 55
TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
U.R.C.P. Rule 55(c) provides that for good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default.

The facts of this

case do present sufficient good cause justifying the setting
aside of the default judgment and the lower court erred in
refusing to do so.
In Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984), the
Utah Supreme Court reversed a default judgment, due to the trial
court's failure to follow the strict guidelines of U.R.C.P. Rule
55(b)(2) prescribing the procedures to be followed by trial
courts in entertaining judgments against defaulting parties.
"Courts are not at liberty to deviate from those rules [governing
default judgments] just because one party is in default and is
not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case."
Id. at 1195.

Russell,

Therein, the court had a much less sympathetic

Defendant, inasmuch as Defendant filed no answer and had stated
with indifference that he felt no legal obligation to respond to
Plaintiff's claims.

Those statements negated, in the court's

opinion, the requisite diligence in actively defending against
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Plaintiff's claims.

Mr. Harrisonfs actions, in sharp contrast,

show his diligence in actively defending against Plaintiff's
claims.

Under these circumstances, he should not be punished

with a default judgment brought about by one, inadvertent,
excusable mistake.
Under U.R.C.P. Rule 55(b)(2), it was also necessary for
the court to determine the amount of damages and establish the
truth of the averments in the complaint by the taking of evidence
at the hearing.

Failure to do so constitutes additional good

cause for setting aside the entry of default.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the Utah jurisprudence disfavoring judgments
by default and favoring a hearing on

the merits in contested

matters, Defendant - Appellant urges this Court to reverse the
circuit court's Judgment by Default and to set aside such default
judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect under U.R.C.P. Rule
60(b)(1).
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of May, 1987.
BTE^B^^^SIAM, & HATCH

JfTZane

Gill

Ann Wise
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
-9-

ADDENDUM

Page
1
7, 1987
9:48 AM
Filing Date: 11/01/84

D O C K E T

WEDNESDAY

FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT - SLC
Case
: 845102950 CV Civil
Case Title:
WILLIAMS MICHAEL VS HARRISON" M CHRIS

JANUARY

Cause of Action:

Amount of Suit.:
Return Date.. . . . :
Judgment
:
Disposition....:

$ . 00
Date:
Date:

Court Set: TRIAL

Amt:

$. 00

on 01/05/87 at 0930 A in room ? with RCG

No Tracking Activity.

No Accounts Payable Activity,

Party..: PLA Plaintiff
Name...:
WILLIAMS MICHAEL
Home Phone.: (
)

Work Phone.: (

)

Party..: DEF Defendant
Name...:
HARRISON M CHRIS
Home Phone.: (
)

Work Phone.: (

)

02/25/86 Case converted from SLC system... Civil file date 11/01/84.
I 10/17/86 FILED NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL (DEFENDANT)
I 10/27/86 FILED NOTICE TO APPEAR IN PERSON OR APPOINT OTHER COUNSEL
I 11/05/86 FILED REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING
11/18/86 TRL
scheduled for 1/ 5/87 at 9:30 A in room ? with RCG
01/05/87 GIBSON/CKO T870002 C44 PLAINTIFF PRESENT THRU ATTY ROBERT LORD.
DEFENDANT NOT PRESENT. PLAINTIFF NOT PREPARED WITH EVIDENCE.
I
PLAINTIFFS ATTY MOTION FOR JUDGMENT C/0 MOTION DENIED
End of the docket report for this case.

EXHIBIT _ A

SLC
MRS
MRS
NMD
NMD
CK0
CK0
CKO

ROBERT L. LORD
Utah State Bar No. 1994
Attorney for Plaintiff
444 Metropolitan Law Building
431 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-4241
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
—oooOooo—
MICHAEL WILLIAMS,
JUDGMEN^TBY DEFAULT

. • . Plaintiff,

Civil

vs.

NQ/84~CV-10295

M. CHRIS HARRISON,
. . . Defendant.
—oooOooo—•
The above entitled matter came bn regularly for trial before the
undersigned, one of the judges of the above entitled court, on the 5 th day of
January, 1987, at the hour of 9:30 a.m.

Plaintiff appeared by and through his

attorney, Robert L. Lord. No one appeared on behalf of the defendant, whereupon
counsel for the plaintiff moved for judgment pursuant to the prayer of the
complaint on file herein.
The Court, having considered the motion of the plaintiff, together with
the memorandum in support thereof, having examined the files and records herein,
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, hereby finds that the
plaintiff is entitled to a return of the $2,100 advance fees paid to the defendant for
failure of the defendant to provide services as agreed.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises
aforesaid, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said plaintiff do
have and recover from the defendant, the sum of $2,100, interest thereon at the
rate of 10% per annum from December 15, 1983, in the sum of $647.50, together
with plaintiff's costs and disbursement incurred in this action amounting to the sum

EXHIBIT
37-J22W/J

&

of $30.00, making a total judgment of $2,777.50, all to bear interest at the rate
of 12% per annum from the date hereof till paid.
DATED this ^L day of January 1987.
BY THE COU£TJ

Circuit Court Judge

2

ROBERT U LORD
Utah State Bar No, 1994
Attorney for Plaintiff
444 Metropolitan Law Building
431 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 8*111
Telephone: 328-4241

MAR 2 3 1287
D . n c LIAPI .., * ii^ru
BlELF HASLAfj & U C r i

-

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
—oooOooo—
MICHAEL WILLIAMS,

)
• «. .

Plaintiff,

VS.

M. CHRIS HARRISON,
•

. . Defendant.

4

)

ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

)

Civil No. 84-CV-10295

)

)

—oooOooo—
The defendant's motion to set aside default judgment came on regularly
for hearing before the undersigned, one of the judges of the above entitled court,
on the 18th day of March, 1987. Plaintiff was represented by his attorney, Robert
L. Lord* Defendant was present in court and represented by his attorney, L. Zane
Gill.
The Court, having reviewed the files and records herein, having weighed
and considered the affidavits submitted in supf>brt and opposition to the motion
together with the representations and arguments of counsel, finding that the
defendant had failed to use due diligence prior to the trial, and that there was no
excusable neglect excusing him for failing to appear for the trial, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendant's motion be, and the same hereby is, denied.
DATED this

day of March 1987.
BY THE COURT:

/

Robert C* Gibson
Circuit Court 3udge

39-M20WH-O

EXHIBIT

C-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid,
this date of March 20, 1987, to L. Zane Gill, attorney for defendant, 50 West
Broadway, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 8410L

y?\
Carol 3." Lord"- Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copies
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, by placing the same in the
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on this 26th day of May, 1987, addressed as
follows:

Robert L. Lord
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
444 Metropolitan Law Building
431 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, OT 84111

